Indeed, rather than blame such problems on the strategy it is more appropriate to explain the choice of strategy in terms of the implications for Korea of such resource deficiencies.
In spite of its resource problems, Korea displayed a number of internal characteristics by the early to mid 1960s. when the strategy was embarked upon, which probably contributed substantially to its success but were independent of it. These included: the homogeneity of the nation: the experience of 'redistribution before growth' as a result partly of the Civil War and partly of two far reaching land reforms: the efficient, literate and flexible nature of Korean labour, willingly or unwillingly tolerant of a strict social discipline: the emergence of viable local enterprises, organised along the lines of the Japanese Zaibatsu: and finally, the rise of a veiy powerful, highly centralised state I see Adelman and Robinson 19781. What is particularly important and unusual about the latter is that this government's most important objective, apart from defence itself, was rapid economic developmentessentially for the sake of national security against the North Korean threat. In Korea's external environment there were also a number of factors which favoured the success of the strategy. Between 1953 and 1965 the vast volumes of grant aid given to Korea by the USA made it possible to reconstruct much of the economic infrastructure, to engage in wide-spread human resource investments and to satisfy basic consumption needs simultaneously I Hasan 1976 I Hasan : 2161 . This aid, induced largely by the US commitment to the containment of communism in the area, also meant that Korea had virtually no foreign debt obligations in the early years of the strategy. The later latter half of the 1960s was marked by Korea's exports to, contracts in and remittances from Vietnam, and more generally, by a rapid expansion of world trade Frank et al 1975 :231, Sano 1977 : 45, Hassan 1976 .Whilst in the course of the 1970s, protectionism and resouce nationalism (to some extent counteracted by contracts in the Middle East) became increasingly problematic for Korea. the fact remains that the strategy was implemented in the context of parameters which were on the whole rather favourable to it.
Centrai Features of the Strategy
Had the Korean Government in this context embarked upon an export strategy involving the indiscriminate promotion of free trade and foreign investment.
expecting market forces and transnational corporations (TNCs) to act as the vehicles for the country's economic development, then it might indeed have constituted a straightforward case for dependency thinking. But clearly that is not what occurred. The state, it appears. has been far more active as an initiating, implementing and controlling factor in the Korean economy than is commonly recognised see Luedde-Neurath 1980. Kim and Rogier 1976 , Kim 1974 . Ashdown 1979 This finds reflection in the powerful policy tools with which its economic objectivesas formalised in various five year plans and in specific industrial promotion lawscould he and were pursued. These included the government's right directly to initiate industrial projects and to designate specific firms to take them up: strict financial control, which is likely to have been the single most important directive tool (by maintaining a tight control on all major financial institutions in Korea, it could influence not only the distribution but also the terms of creditfor favoured projects. real interest rates were often zero or even negative): the power to interfere directly with prices, profit margins. taxes and even the organisation of enterprises by way of selective measures directed at specific firms: and finally, trade controls, which in Korea did not merely comprise the commonly reported tariffs and selective quantitative restrictions, but were supplemented by certain highly effective direct measures. (Individuals or firms required a licence and registration to engage in foreign trade, in addition to which they often also required a specific licence for every transaction: the export-import link' system in turn could make permission to import conditional on a satisfactory export performance. Finally, special customs duties could be imposed so as to curb excess profits on imports.) All this was apart from the incentive measures and fiscal and monetary policies often misleadingly presented as the only tools operating in Korea to promote the strategy. They were also accompanied by rather more objectionable policies which imposed a strict social discipline Ofl the work force.
As regards the external factors, first, the government controlled the level as well as utilisation of foreign loans by guaranteeing their repayment and by restricting private off-shore borrowing. This measure was particularly important. given that the vast majority of foreign investment in Korea took the form of loans rather than of direct investment. The government also ensured complementarity between local and foreign banks in Korea. This was done by stipulating that the main source of funds of the latter should he borrowing from their head office as opposed to local deposits, and that lending on the local market should proceed via 'swap' transactions with the Bank of Korea. As with domestic banks, there was interference with the terms and distribution of credit. Foreign direct investment was controlled by prior screening and the frequent imposition of export conditions as well as ownership share ratios, even before 1974, when a more explicit and formal distinction came to be made between eligible and ineligible types of direct investments I see Cohen 1975:72. lt is primarily in free trade zoneswhich employed about I per cent of Korea's working population in 1975that government interference has indeed been minimal, apart that is from the stipulation that all their production must be exported. lt should also be noted that foreign trading companies may not operate in Korea, that the country's stock market is off limits to foreigners and that Korea's patent act appears to entail a curious provision dealing wiih the limits of patent rights which seems to suggest that infringement of patents is perm itted if the goods are to be exported I Kim and Rogier 1976:470 I. though the precise implications of these factors have yet to be evaluated.
lt is the combination of policy tools rather than any single one which has enabled the Korean Government to mobilise and direct, but also to monitor and control, both local and foreign factors in its economy. In practice, the government has played a more interventionist role in the l970s than in the l960s: it is hardly surprising that Korea has been described as one of the free w orld : most tight/v supervised economies, with the government initialing almost cien' major investment br the private sector and wielding enough power to ensure that companies which make such investments also make a profit IC. Smith. Financial Times supplement. Naturally, noting the existence of such policy tools does not tell us exactly who benefited from their application; it might be large rather than small local firms, or foreign as opposed to local enterprises.
Domestically. there is little doubt that a small number of large enterprise groups were the main beneficiaries rather than small firms. More relevant to the dependency debate is the fact that the Korean government has sought to promote national firms wherever possible and to assign a specific complementary role to external factors.
The evidence provided in this section is strongly at variance with versions of dependency thinking which view the role of Korea's policy towards foreign elements as unimportant, ineffective, or worst of all, as an 'instrument' of foreign capital see Frank 1979:241 it has not represented a chronic problem to date.
Ironically, Korea's debt may turn out to constitute a weapon against developed country (especially US) protectionism, given that arguably it would be this protectionism rather than lack of Korean export competitiveness which would be at the root of any default on its debt.
Summing up this section, it appears that the benefits to Korea from the strategy of export orientation have been understated by dependency analysis while the problems have been exaggerated. That is not to deny, however, that, according to many important criteria, the experience is open to severe criticism, especially in relation to its social costs. lt should also be noted that the 1978-79 period has been marked by a reversal of the trends described, though so far at least Korea's ability to deal with economic crises has been remarkable and has continuously defied dependency expectations.
Trends in Korean Dependence
In an absolute sense Korea has clearly increased its dependence on the international system over the last two decades. On each of these levels, problems may arise or, indeed, be imminent. To the extent that the nature of Koreas structural integration into the global system is such as to prevent the adjustments that may be necessary to cope with such problemsfor example, reorientation of production, increases in domestic value added or a more balanced geographical distribution of tradeits dependence on that system may indeed turn out to be problematic. lt is not at all clear, however, that Korea will be unable to adapt to the new realities of the world economy, and hence the questions arising from the vulnerabilities outlined should not be prejudged at this stage. If we accept that loans are less problematic than direct investment, and joint ventures are preferable to wholly owned subsidiaries from the point of view of potential foreign control, it follows that Korea pursued a relatively wise approach to foreign investment, thereby probably avoiding some of the pitfalls that a great reliance on direct investment may have entailed.
In essence, however, the issue of external control is not resolved by pointing to the predominance of loans and joint ventures in Korea. simply because foreign domination can take many and rather subtle forms, such as sub-contracting or technology licensing for example. The difficulties arising from this cannot be resolved here. Instead, four reasons will be suggested why Korea may be acquiring a greater degree of independence in the world system. generally fails to acknowledge the existence, let alone the importance, of such movements. which have taken place in spite of export orientation. And in ignoring factors which modify its own predictions or even negate them, it has tended to miss precisely those aspects of the Korean experience which make the case particularly interesting.
Conclusion
Perhaps the central conclusion of this article is that the manner in which dependency thinking has so far been applied to the Korean experience has not been particularly helpful to its understanding. If anything, it has posed obstacles to the analysis of the most interesting features of the case.
The irrelevance of the type of dependency thinking applied to the Korean case so far can be traced primarily to its rigid perceptions and mechanistic predictions with respect to the nature and outcome of the interaction between Korea's internal factors and their external environment. All too often, it seems, theoretical preconceptions have taken precedence over the careful analysis of the actual experience and the policies at its root.
In a modified form, on the other hand, dependency thinking can be extremely useful, indeed indispensable for the analysis of cases such as Korea, when it is perceived as a body of theories which expose potentially problematic types of interaction between internal and external factors of ldcs, as well as possible adverse implications for their development.
Seen in this way, dependency thinking constitutes the basis for an investigation of the extent to which such problems have materialised, been modified or even avoided in practice. In our view, it is this approach which is likely to yield the most interesting questions for investigation in the Korean case and which may in turn throw a new light on the veiy nature of dependency, orwhat is most important for ldcson how it might be counteracted.
noie: the more general dependency references are not given here but in the bibliography at the end of this Bulletin.
